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Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals from a conditional guilty plea to one count of arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in violation of UTAH CODE 
ANN. §58-37-8 (1998 & Supp. 2001). This Court has jurisdiction under UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1) Does the admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing, pursuant to 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, violate a defendant's right to confrontation 
under either the United States or the Utah Constitution? 
Standard of review. "Issues of constitutional interpretation are questions of law," 
reviewed for correctness. State v. Valencia, 2001 Utah Ct. App. 159,110, 27 P.3d 573. 
2) Does the admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing, pursuant to 
Article I Section 12 of the Utah Constitution, deny a defendant his right to a preliminary 
hearing? 
Standard of review. The standard of review is the same as that for the first issue. 
3) Did the State present sufficient evidence at the preliminary hearing to support a 
reasonable belief that defendant committed the crimes charged in the information? 
Standard of review. "The determination of whether to bind a criminal defendant 
over for trial is a question of law" reviewed without deference to the trial court. State v. 
Clark, 2001 UT 9, f 8, 20 P.3d 300. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following constitutional provisions and rules are contained in Addendum A: 
U.S. CONST, amend. VI; 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12; 
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 58-37-8, 58-37a-5 (1998 & Supp. 2001); 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h); 
UtahR.Evid. 1101,1102. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The State charged defendant with one count each of distribution of a controlled 
substance, a first degree felony; arranging to distribute a controlled substance also a first 
degree felony; possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree felony; and 
possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor (R. 1-2). 
The magistrate bound defendant over on all charges following a preliminary 
hearing (R. 18-19). Defendant filed a motion to quash the bindover (R. 25-26, 41-51), 
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which the district court denied (R. 57-58). Defendant then entered a conditional guilty 
plea to a reduced charge of arranging to distribute a controlled substance, a second degree 
felony, and the State dismissed the remaining charges (R. 79-80, 83-91). Defendant's 
conditional plea reserved the right to appeal the denial of his motion to quash the 
bindover (R. 87). 
The district court sentenced defendant to thirty-six months probation with the 
condition that he serve thirty days in jail - in 96 hour increments - to be completed by 31 
December 2001 (R. 97-99, 116-120). The district court also ordered defendant to report 
to the jail immediately following sentencing and submit to a drug test (id.). If he tested 
negative, he was to be released (id.). But if he tested positive, he was to be immediately 
incarcerated for two weeks (id.) Defendant tested positive (R. 108-09, 114-15). He was 
released two weeks later with credit for time served (id.). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
Detective Thomas's testimony at the preliminary hearing: 
Events of16 July 1999 
At the preliminary hearing the State called detective Clark Thomas of the Central 
Utah Narcotics Task Force (R. 125:4). He testified that on 16 July 1999 he was in Mt. 
Pleasant, Utah conducting a narcotics investigation (R. 125:5). He and a fellow task force 
1
 Unless otherwise noted, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution. See State v. Hawatmeh, 2001 UT 51, K 3, 26 P.3d 223 ("At the preliminary 
hearing . . . 'the magistrate should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
prosecution and resolve all inferences in favor of the prosecution.'") (quoting State v. 
Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 (Utah 1998)). 
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officer met with a confidential informant at approximately 10:00 p.m. (id.). Detective 
Thomas extensively searched both the informant and his vehicle, then supplied him with 
currency and a monitoring device (R. 125:5, 13-15). The informant entered the Triangle 
Bar while the officers waited outside (R. 125:5, 16-17). 
The informant met defendant's brother, Mitchell Hill, inside the bar (R. 125:6-7, 
12). Mitchell explained that defendant would arrive shortly with methamphetamine for 
sale (id.). When defendant arrived he and the informant left the bar (id.). Detective 
Thomas then observed defendant sell one gram of methamphetamiine to the informant for 
$60.00 (R. 125:7-8). The informant reentered the bar momentarily, then exited and met 
Detective Thomas at a prearranged location (R. 125:8, 17, 21-22). There, Detective 
Thomas again searched the informant extensively and the informant delivered one gram 
of methamphetamine (R. 125:8,16). 
Although Detective Thomas could not recall whether the substance was field 
tested, he testified that, in his experience, the appearance of the substance was consistent 
with methamphetamine and that it had been purported to be methamphetamine (R. 125:8, 
16). He also testified that the Triangle Bar was located within 1,000 feet of an arcade, a 
church and a school (R. 125:8-9). 
Events of 3! July 2001 
Detective Thomas then testified that on 31 July 2001 he conducted a second 
narcotics investigation in Mt. Pleasant (R. 125:9). A confidential informant had 
previously informed Detective Thomas that defendant and his brother were transporting 
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one-half ounce of methamphetamine to Mt. Pleasant (id.). Detective Thomas placed a 
monitoring device on the informant and the informant made arrangements to meet 
defendant and his brother at 64 West Main (id.). 
As Detective Thomas and other task force officers watched the 64 West Main 
location, defendant and his brother arrived in a truck (R. 125:9-10, 11). Defendant was 
driving (R. 125: 27). Both were arrested before any drug transaction took place (R. 
125:9-10). The arrests occurred within 1000 feet of an arcade, church, and school (R. 
125:10). 
Detective Thomas testified that task force officers searched defendant's truck 
following the arrests (R. 125:10). At this point defense counsel objected to Detective 
Thomas testifying about the actions of other officers on the grounds that it violated 
defendant's right to confrontation under both the Utah and United States Constitutions (R. 
125:11). The magistrate overruled the objection (id.). Detective Thomas then testified 
that Commander Pierson found two yellowish rocky substances in two plastic bags inside 
a Camel cigarette container under the front seat of defendant's truck (R. 125:10-11, 27). 
The substance filed tested positive as methamphetamine (R. 125:10). Detective Thomas 
could not recall, however, whether he or another officer performed the field test (R. 
125:23-24). No lab test results were provided (R. 125:23). Over defendant's continuing 
objection Detective Thomas also testified that Officer Thayne located a glass pipe 
covered with white powdery residue inside a compartment in the driver's side door of 
defendant's truck (R. 125: 10-12, 27). 
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Defendant confesses 
Following their arrests both defendant and his brother provided urine samples that 
tested positive for methamphetamine (R. 125:11, 26). Detective Thomas also interviewed 
defendant (R. 125:12). After one of the other officers advised defendant of his Miranda 
rights, defendant admitted that he had purchased the half ounce of methamphetamine in 
Salt Lake City and that he had arranged to sell it to an individual named Mike who lived 
in the back of a video store located at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant (R. 125:12, 26). 
Defendant also admitted that he and his brother had smoked some of the 
methamphetamine while traveling from Salt Lake to Mt. Pleasant (id.). 
Cross-examination of Detective Thomas 
On cross-examination, defense counsel asked Detective Thomas to reveal the 
identity of the confidential informant (R. 125:13). The prosecutor objected and the 
magistrate sustained the objection (id.). The prosecutor acknowledged, however, that 
while he would eventually have to divulge the informant's identity, he objected to doing 
so at the preliminary hearing because the informant was still working with the task force 
(R. 125:13,17). 
Nevertheless, the magistrate allowed defense counsel to probe Detective Thomas 
regarding the informant's reliability (R. 125:18-21). Over the prosecutor's objection, 
defense counsel asked whether Detective Thomas had ever arrested the informant (R. 
125:18). Detective Thomas testified that he had not (id.). He also testified that the 
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informant was not receiving financial compensation for his services, but was assisting the 
task force to have a third-party's charges dismissed (R. 125:19). 
At this point defense counsel asked the magistrate to continue the preliminary 
hearing until the prosecution could disclose the informant's identity (R. 125:19-20). The 
magistrate denied the motion (R. 125:20). Defense counsel then inquired about the 
informant's criminal history (id.). Detective Thomas testified that the informant was on 
probation (id.). He also testified that the informant had been reliable on ten or more 
occasions, and that he did not believe the informant had never lied to him (R. 125:20-21). 
The informant had also been trained regarding entrapment issues (R. 125:22). Defense 
counsel then requested a copy of the packet of information regarding entrapment issues 
that the task force provides informants (R. 125: 23). Detective Thomas explained that he 
could provide defense counsel with a copy if his commander agreed (id.). 
Defense counsel also repeatedly asked Detective Thomas to relate, verbatim, the 
monitored conversations between defendant, Mitchell, and the informant (R. 125:18, 21, 
23). Detective Thomas could not recall the conversations verbatim, but explained that he 
would produce the audio tape recordings of the 16 and 31 July events to both the 
prosecutor and defense counsel (R. 125:17, 18, 21, 23). 
Following Detective Thomas's testimony, defense counsel again asked the 
magistrate to continue the preliminary hearing on the ground that defendant had been 
denied his right to confrontation (R. 125:28). The magistrate again denied the motion and 
bound defendant over on all charges (R. 18-19, 125:29). 
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Defendant never filed a formal discovery request (see Record generally). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. The admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing does not 
violate a criminal defendant's right to confrontation under either ihe Utah or the United 
States Constitution. The Utah Constitution explicitly allows the admission of reliable 
hearsay at a preliminary hearing, and the United States Supreme Court has held that the 
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment does not apply to preliminary hearings. 
Point II. The use of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing does not deprive a 
criminal defendant of his right to a preliminary hearing. Although a defendant may seek 
to use a preliminary hearing as a discovery device, the purpose of a preliminary hearing is 
constitutionally limited to determining probable cause. Sound policy supports this 
limitation. Requiring a defendant to pursue discovery through the procedures provided in 
rule 16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, rather than the preliminary hearing, does not 
deny a defendant his right to a preliminary hearing. 
Point III. In this case the State presented ample evidence to support a reasonable 
belief that defendant committed the offenses charged in the information. Contrary to 
defendant's representation, most of the evidence establishing probable cause was not 
hearsay, but consisted of defendant's confession and the testifying officer's direct 
observations. The small amount of hearsay evidence that was necessary to the finding of 
probable cause was "reliable hearsay" as defined by rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSES OF THE UTAH AND 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS DO NOT APPLY AT 
PRELIMINARY HEARINGS 
Defendant argues that the confrontation clauses of both the Utah and United States 
Constitutions apply to preliminary hearings. See Br. of Aplt. at 7. However, neither the 
State nor the Federal Constitution extend confrontation rights to preliminary hearings. 
A. The confrontation clause of the Utah Constitution does not 
apply at preliminary hearings. 
Defendant cites State v. Anderson, 612 P.2d 778, 785 (Utah 1980), to support his 
assertion that the confrontation clause of the Utah Constitution applies at a preliminary 
hearing. See Br. of Aplt. at 12-15. The Anderson court held that "the protections 
afforded by the right of confrontation . . . must be guaranteed the accused at the 
preliminary hearing." 612 P.2d at 785. The viability of Anderson, however, has been 
seriously debated. See Mark L. Allred, Comment, Confrontation Rights and Preliminary 
Hearings, 1986 UTAH L. REV. 75, 81-90. 
For example, not long after Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court expressly stated 
that "on the issue of defendants' right to confrontation, we hold that the Utah 
Constitutional provision, Article I, Section 12, should be construed the same as the 
Federal Constitutional provision." State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 (Utah 1981). The 
federal view is that confrontation rights do not apply at preliminary hearings. See Point I, 
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B below. Thus, Brooks indirectly disavowed the language in Anderson upon which 
defendant relies. 
The Utah Supreme Court further underscored its rejection of this portion of 
Anderson when it promulgated the original Utah Rules of Evidence and Criminal 
Procedure. See Paul G. Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice: The Case for and the 
Effects of Utah's Victims' Rights Amendment, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1373,1433-34. The 
court adopted all of the simultaneously repealed Code of Criminal Procedure except for 
two provisions, which it viewed as inconsistent with its previous decisions. Id. at 1433. 
Among the provisions adopted by the court was the provision allowing hearsay at 
preliminary hearings. See Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h)(2) ("The findings of probable cause may 
be based on hearsay in whole or in part."). The court did so despite its holding in 
Anderson, and its earlier adoption of rules 1101(a) & (b), Utah Rules of Evidence, which 
extended the rules of evidence, including the prohibition on hearsay, to all court 
proceedings including preliminary hearings.2 See Cassell, Balancing the Scales of 
Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1433-34 and accompanying notes. 
Any confusion over the applicability of the right to confrontation in Utah's 
preliminary hearings was resolved with the 1995 amendment to Article I, Section 12 of 
the Utah Constitution. When Anderson was decided in 1980, the Utah Constitution stated 
2
 In 1995, rule 1101, Utah Rules of Evidence was amended to state that "In a 
criminal preliminary examination, nothing in these rules shall be construed to prevent the 
admission of reliable hearsay evidence/" Utah R. Evid. 1101 (1995). The rule was again 
amended in 1999 to state that "In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay 
shall be admissibte as provided under Rule 1102." Utah R. Evid. 1101 (1999). 
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that "[i]n criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right... to be confronted by 
the witnesses against him." UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. The 1995 amendment, however, 
explicitly allows the admission of reliable hearsay at a preliminary hearing. It states in 
relevant part: 
Nothing in this constitution shall preclude the use of reliable hearsay 
evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole or in part at any preliminary 
examination to determine probable cause or at any pretrial proceeding with 
respect to release of the defendant if appropriate discovery is allowed as 
defined by statute or rule. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. Thus, by explicitly allowing the admission of reliable hearsay 
at preliminary hearings, the 1995 amendment overruled Anderson and clarified that the 
right of confrontation does not apply at a preliminary hearing. See Cassell, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1440; see also Utah R. Evid. 1102 advisory 
committee's note (observing that the 1995 constitutional amendment abrogated 
Anderson). 
The Utah Supreme Court acknowledged the nullification of Anderson in State v. 
Clarkr 2001UT 9, f 16 n.3,20 P.3d 300. Whereas Anderson was decided on the premise 
that "[t]he probable cause showing necessary in the preliminary examination differs from 
that required for an arrest warrant/' 612 P.2d at 783, the court announced in Clark that it 
no longer saw "a principled basis for attempting to maintain a distinction between the 
arrest warrant probable cause standard and the preliminary hearing probable cause 
standard." Clark, 2001 UT 9, ^ 16, 20 P.3d 300. Ironically, Anderson acknowledged that 
the finding of probable cause in the context of an arrest warrant usually rests exclusively 
il 
on hearsay evidence. 612 P.2d at 783 n. 11 (citing Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 
79 S. Ct. 329 (1959)). Additionally, the Clark court noted that Anderson viewed the 
preliminary examination not as a one-sided determination of probable cause, but an 
adversarial proceeding in which certain procedural safeguards are recognized. Id. at n.3. 
The Clark court then observed that "this distinction has been somewhat reduced by the 
recent amendment to the Utah Constitution allowing for the admission of 'reliable 
hearsay evidence' at 'preliminary examinations.'" Id. 
In sum, by explicitly allowing the admission of reliable hearsay at preliminary 
hearings, the 1995 amendment to Article I, Section 12 overruled Anderson's holding that 
the right to confrontation extended to preliminary hearings. Thus, Anderson does not 
support defendant's position. 
B. The confrontation clause of the United States Constitution 
does not apply at preliminary hearings. 
Defendant acknowledges that the 1995 amendment "may modify the right to 
confront witnesses [at preliminary hearings] under Utah Constitutional law." Br. of Aplt. 
at 10. He nevertheless argues that the Utah constitutional amendment violates the Sixth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution which, according to defendant, grants a 
criminal defendant the right to confrontation at a preliminary hearing. Br. of Aplt. at 10-
15. However, as the Utah Supreme Court observed, "the United States Supreme Court 
has held that the protections afforded criminal defendants by the Confrontation Clause do 
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not extend to preliminary hearings." State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.4 (Utah 
1995) (citing Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120-22, 95 S. Ct. 854, 866-67 (1975)). 
The very nature of the right to confrontation renders it inapplicable at a 
preliminary hearing. Confrontation is not synonymous with "cross examination." Barber 
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719, 725, 88 S. Ct. 1318,1322 (1968). Rather, confrontation "includes 
both the opportunity to cross-examine and the occasion for the jury to weigh the 
demeanor of the witness" Id. (emphasis added). Indeed, the Utah Supreme Court 
observed that "[t]he essence of the confrontation right is the opportunity to have the 
accusing witness in court and subject to cross-examination, so that bias and credibility 
can be evaluated by the finder of fact" State v. Nelson, 125 P2d 1353, 1356 (Utah 1986) 
(citing Anderson, 612 P.2d at 785) (emphasis added). Thus, a principle purpose of 
confrontation is to provide the fact-finder with the opportunity to assess a witness's 
credibility. See Barber, 390 U.S. at 721, 725, 88 S. Ct at 1320, 1322. 
The magistrate presiding over a preliminary hearing, however, "is precluded from 
evaluating the weight of otherwise credible evidence." State v. Talbot, 972 P.2d 435, 438 
(Utah 1998). Rather, "the magistrate's evaluation of credibility at a preliminary hearing is 
limited to determining that 'evidence is wholly lacking and incapable of reasonable 
inference to prove some issue which supports the [prosecution's] claim.'" Id. (quoting 
Pledger, 896 P.2d at 1229). Thus, because credibility determinations are extremely 
limited at a preliminary hearing, the right to confrontation, by its very nature, is 
inapplicable. Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that "the 
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right to confrontation is basically a trial right." Barber, 390 U.S. at 725, 88 S. Ct. at 1322 
(emphasis added); see also California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157, 90 S. Ct. 1930, 1934-
35 (1970) ("it is this literal right to 'confront' the witnesses at the time of trial that forms 
the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause.") (emphasis added). 
Case law supports this conclusion. First, there is no federal constitutional right to 
a preliminary hearing to determine whether a case should proceed to trial. See Lem Woon 
v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586, 590, 33 S. Ct. 783, 784 (1913); Gerstein 420 U.S. at 119, 95 S. 
Ct. at 865. Thus, if a state grants an accused the right to a preliminary hearing, it does so 
purely as a matter of state law. 
If a state provides a criminal defendant with a preliminary hearing where the 
accused is allowed to cross-examine prosecution witnesses and may demand the dismissal 
of charges not supported by probable cause, then the Sixth Amendment guarantees the 
assistance of counsel at that hearing. Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9-10, 90 S. Ct. 
1999, 2003 (1970). Nevertheless, the United States Supreme Court later held that if the 
issue is simply determining whether probable cause exists, the issue "can be determined 
reliably without an adversary hearing." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 120, 95 S. Ct. 
854, 866 (1975). Indeed, probable cause "traditionally has been decided by a magistrate 
in a nonadversary proceeding on hearsay and written testimony." Id. Thus, the United 
States Supreme Court has never held the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment 
applicable to preliminary hearings. See Goldsby v. United States, 160 U.S. 70,73, 16 S. 
Ct. 216, 218 (1895) ("The contention . . . that because there had been no preliminary 
14 
examination of the accused, he was thereby deprived of his constitutional guaranty to be 
confronted by the witnesses, by mere statement, demonstrates its error."); 4 WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 14.4(C), at 172 (2nd ed. 1999) ("[T]he Supreme 
Court has long held that cross-examination at a preliminary hearing is not required by the 
confrontation clause of the Sixth Amendment."). Accordingly, neither Utah nor the 
United States Constitution guarantees the right to confrontation at preliminary hearings. 
II. THE ADMISSION OF RELIABLE HEARSAY AT A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING DOES NOT DENY A 
DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY HEARING 
A. A preliminary hearing is not a discovery device. 
Defendant argues that the admission of reliable hearsay effectively denied him his 
right to a preliminary hearing because it prevented him from developing testimony for use 
as impeachment at trial, preserving favorable testimony for trial, and using the 
preliminary hearing as a discovery device. Br. of Aplt at 9-10, 15-16. This argument 
ignores the constitutionally limited purpose of a preliminary hearing. The purpose of a 
preliminary hearing is not to develop potential impeachment for trial, preserve favorable 
testimony, or discover the State's case. UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12. Instead, "the function 
of [a preliminary] examination is limited to determining whether probable cause exists 
unless otherwise provided by statute." Id. (emphasis added). 
Sound policy supports this limitation on the scope of preliminary hearings. Rule 
16, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides defendants with the right to discovery. 
See Utah R. Crim. P. 16; Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 
1453. The State incurs significant costs when defendants are allowed to circumvent rule 
16 by using the hearing as a discovery device and preventing the admission of reliable 
hearsay. See Cassell, Balancing the Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1437-1440 
("The bar against hearsay evidence at preliminary hearings . . . places a significant claim 
on state resources."). The length of preliminary hearings is also significantly increased. 
Id Thus, allowing reliable hearsay at preliminary hearings and requiring defendant's to 
use rule 16 to conduct discovery, rather than the preliminary hearing, promotes both fiscal 
and judicial economy. 
Moreover, the 1995 amendment to the Utah Constitution moved Utah back into 
harmony with the majority of states on the discovery issue. See Cassell, Balancing the 
Scales of Justice, 1994 UTAH L. REV. at 1453; 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, ET AL., CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE §14.1(a), at 110 (2nd ed. 1999). Most states agree that the purpose of a 
preliminary hearing is to allow for an independent screening of the prosecutions decision 
to charge. Id.; see also, Allred, Confrontation Rights and Preliminary Hearings, 1986 
UTAH L. REV. at 84-86 (noting that most states adhere to the position that "[i]t is not the 
purpose of the preliminary examination to provide a means for the discovery of 
evidence."). 
In this case, defendant attempted to conduct discovery by means of his preliminary 
hearing, rather rule 16, the means provided by law. While the admission of reliable 
hearsay may have hindered defendant from manipulating the preliminary hearing to serve 
his discovery-oriented purposes, such a result was justified by the constitutional limitation 
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on the scope of preliminary hearings. Defendant should have pursued his discovery under 
the rules of criminal procedure rather than attempting to expand the purpose of the 
preliminary hearing. 
B. The admission of reliable hearsay does not deny defendant 
the opportunity to challenge the strength of the State's 
probable cause showing. 
Defendant also argues that the admission of reliable hearsay effectively denied his 
right to a preliminary hearing because it prevented him from exposing any weaknesses in 
the State's case. Br. of Aplt. at 9-10,15-16. The right to challenge the State's showing 
of probable cause at a preliminary hearing, however, is protected by the right to counsel, 
not the right to confrontation. See Coleman, 399 U.S. at 9, 90 S. Ct. at 2003 (requiring 
the assistance of counsel at preliminary hearings); Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120,95 S. Ct. 
866 (1975) (holding that probable cause may be based on hearsay and determined without 
adversary safeguards). Defendant was represented by counsel at the preliminary hearing 
who cross-examined the prosecution witness and had an opportunity to call witnesses in 
defendant's behalf (R. 125:13-29). Thus, the admission of reliable hearsay may have 
prevented defendant from manipulating the preliminary hearing to serve his discovery-
oriented purposes, but it did not impair his right to a fair hearing. 
Furthermore, defendant was not prejudiced by the admission of reliable hearsay 
because a preliminary hearing magistrate "[was] precluded from evaluating the weight of 
otherwise credible evidence." See Talbot, 972 P.2d at 438. When hearsay evidence is 
reliable, it is necessarily credible, and the magistrate must accept the evidence without 
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weighing it. Id. Thus, even if defendant could have cross-examined and impeached a 
hearsay declarant, it would not have affected the magistrate's evaluation of the evidence. 
Accordingly, the admission of reliable hearsay did not deny defendant his right to a 
preliminary hearing. See Gerstein, 420 U.S. at 120, 95 S. Ct. at 866 (noting that probable 
cause "traditionally has been decided by a magistrate in a nonadversay proceeding on 
hearsay and written testimony."). 
III. THE STATE PRODUCED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AT THE 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TO SUPPORT A REASONABLE 
BELIEF THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED THE CRIMES 
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION 
The State charged defendant with one count each of distribution of a controlled 
substance, arranging to distribute a controlled substance, possession or use of a controlled 
substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 1-2). Defendant contends that the 
magistrate's bindover order on each of these charges was improper because the State 
relied entirely on hearsay to establish probable cause that he committed these crimes. Br. 
of Apit. at 15-16. Contrary to defendant's characterization, however, most of the 
evidence that the State introduced at the preliminary hearing was not hearsay, but 
consisted of defendant's confession and the testifying officer's direct observations. What 
little hearsay was necessary to establish probable cause was reliable hearsay, as defined 
by rule 1102, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The Utah Supreme Court clarified the bindover standard in State v. Clark, 2001 
UT 9, f 16, 20 P.3d 300. At a preliminary hearing, the prosecution need only present 
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"sufficient evidence to support a reasonable belief that an offense has been committed 
and that the defendant committed it." Id. The court equated this standard to "the arrest 
warrant probable cause standard," and noted that "the quantum of evidence necessary to 
support a bindover is less than that necessary to survive a directed verdict motion." Id. In 
determining whether evidence at a preliminary hearing is sufficient to support a bindover, 
a magistrate must view all facts and reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to 
the prosecution. Id. at f 10. "When faced with conflicting evidence, the magistrate may 
not sift of weigh the evidence . . . but must leave those tasks to the fact finder at trial." Id. 
(quoting State v. Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159 f 7, 3 P.3d 725). 
As discussed above, reliable hearsay is admissible at a preliminary hearing. UTAH 
CONST, art. I, § 12; Utah R. Evid. 1101, 1102. In addition, "The findings of probable 
cause [at a preliminary hearing] may be based on hearsay in whole or in part." Utah R. 
Crim. P. 7(h)(2). 
A. The evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant 
distributed a controlled substance. 
To establish probable cause that defendant distributed a controlled substance, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8(1 )(a)(ii) (1998 & Supp. 2001), the State had to 
produce evidence supporting a reasonable belief that defendant "delivered] other than by 
administering or dispensing a controlled substance/' Id. at § 58-37-2(1 )(n). The State 
met its burden. 
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At the preliminary hearing Detective Thomas testified that he observed defendant 
deliver rnethamphetamine to the informant in exchange for $60.00 (R. 125:7-8). This 
testimony was not hearsay, but was based on Detective Thomas's direct observation. 
There was also sufficient evidence to establish a reasonable belief that the 
substance delivered was a controlled substance. Although no field or lab tests were 
conducted, Detective Thomas testified that, in his experience, the appearance of the 
substance was consistent with rnethamphetamine. This testimony was non-hearsay. He 
also testified that he had overheard defendant's brother tell the informant that defendant 
would arrive with rnethamphetamine for sale (R. 125:6-8,12). Although this testimony 
was hearsay, it constituted reliable hearsay as defined by rule 1102, Utah Rules of 
Evidence and was therefore admissible. 
Rule 1102 defines reliable hearsay, in part, as "hearsay evidence admissible at trial 
under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence, regardless of the availability of the 
declarant at the preliminary examination." Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(2). The statement of 
defendant's brother, that defendant would arrive at the bar with rnethamphetamine to sell 
(R. 125:6-7), satisfied this definition because it constituted a statement against interest 
under rule 804(3), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
A statement against interest is one which "at the time of its making . . . so far 
tend[s] to subject the declarant to civil or criminal liability, that a reasonable person in the 
declarant's position would not have made the statement unless believing it to be true." 
Utah R. Evid. 804(3). Here, the statement of defendant's brother, coupled with 
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defendant's arrival and subsequent sale of methamphetamine to the informant (R. 125:6-
8), arguably amounted to the crime of arranging to distribute a controlled substance. See 
State v. Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159, f 9, 3 P.3d 725 (holding that the offense of 
arranging consists of an intentional or knowing offer or arrangement to distribute 
controlled substances coupled with an act in furtherance of the arrangement). Thus, the 
statement of defendant's brother was against he penal interest and therefore amounted to 
a statement against interest under Rule 804(3), Utah Rules of Evidence. This statement 
against interest was admissible at defendant's preliminary hearing as reliable hearsay. 
UtahR. Evid. 1101(c), 1102(b)(2). 
This reliable hearsay, coupled with the Detective's personal observations regarding 
the characteristics of the substance, was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the 
substance the defendant delivered to the informant was indeed methamphetamine. See 
State v. Rodriguez-LopU 954 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah 1998) (holding that even without a 
toxicology report, an officer's testimony that the substance's appearance was consistent 
with cocaine, coupled with defendant's own statement identifying the substance as 
cocaine, was sufficient for bindover). When considered with Detective Thomas's 
observation of the actual delivery of the methamphetamine in exchange for $60.00, this 
evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant distributed a controlled substance. 
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B. The evidence supported a reasonable belief that 
defendant arranged to distribute a controlled 
substance. 
To establish probable cause thai defendant arranged to distribute a controlled 
substance, the State had to produce evidence supporting a reasonable belief that defendant 
intentionally or knowingly "offerfed] agreefd], consented], or airrange[d] to distribute 
controlled substances." See Hester, 2000 Utah Ct. App. 159, % 9, 3 P.3d 725. 
Additionally, the State had to show that "the defendant... committed some 'act in 
furtherance of an arrangement' to distribute controlled substances." Id. at ^ 10 (quoting, 
State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922, 924 (Utah 1979)). The State satisfied this burden at the 
preliminary hearing. 
Detective Thomas testified that defendant confessed to purchasing a half ounce of 
methamphetamine in Salt Lake City and arranging to sell it to an individual named Mike 
who lived in the back of a video store at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant (R. 125:12, 26). 
This statement was not hearsay, because it was an admission of a party-opponent. See 
Utah R. Evid 801(d)(2). 
Detective Thomas also testified that defendant was arrested at the 64 West Main 
location and that officers found a half ounce of methamphetamine under the front seat of 
his truck (R. 125:9-11,27). The testimony regarding the fruits of another officer's search 
was hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801. Nevertheless, reliable hearsay includes "a statement 
of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer." Utah R. Evid. 1102(b)(6). 
Thus, Detective Thomas's testimony regarding the fruits of the search was reliable 
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hearsay and admissible at the preliminary hearing. UTAH CONST, art. I, §12; Utah R. 
Evid. 1101(c). 
Detective Thomas also testified that the substance recovered from the under the 
front seat of the truck field tested positive as methamphetamine, that defendant had 
admitted that it was methamphetamine, and that defendant tested positive for 
methamphetamine use after his arrest (R. 125:10, 12). As discussed above, this evidence 
was sufficient to support a reasonable belief that the substance was methamphetamine. 
See Rodriguez-Lopi, 954 P.2d at 1293. 
Thus, defendant's admission that he had arranged to sell one-half ounce of 
methamphetamine to an individual at the location where he was arrested, coupled with the 
reliable hearsay evidence that one-half ounce of methamphetamine was found in 
defendant's truck, supported a reasonable belief that defendant arranged to distribute a 
controlled substance. 
C. The evidence supported a reasonable belief that 
defendant possessed or used a controlled substance. 
The State also produced sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that 
defendant possessed or used a controlled substance, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998 & Supp. 2001). Detective Thomas testified that defendant 
admitted to both possession and use of methamphetamine (R. 125:12, 26). As noted 
above, this testimony was not hearsay under rule 801(d)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence. 
Detective Thomas also testified that defendant tested positive for methamphetamine use 
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(R. 125:11, 26). Again, this testimony was not hearsay, but was based on Detective 
Thomas's personal observation (id.). Finally, Detective Thomas's testimony that another 
officer recovered methamphetamine from defendant's truck was reliable hearsay because, 
as noted above, it was the statement of a fellow peace officer. See Utah R. Evid. 
1102(b)(6). This evidence was sufficient to produce a reasonable belief that defendant 
possessed or used a controlled substance. 
D. The evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant 
possessed drug paraphernalia. 
The State also produced sufficient evidence to establish probable cause that 
defendant possessed drug paraphernalia, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5(l) 
(1998). Detective Thomas testified that defendant confessed to having smoked 
methamphetamine on his trip from Salt Lake to Mr. Pleasant, and defendant tested 
positive for methamphetamine use (R. 125:11-12, 26). Again, this testimony was not 
hearsay. See Utah R. Evid. 801(d)(2). Detective Thomas also testified that Officer 
Thayne located a glass pipe covered with white powdery residue inside a compartment in 
the driver's side door of the truck defendant was driving (R. 125:10-12, 27). As 
discussed above, although this testimony regarding a fellow officer's statement was 
hearsay, it was admissible as reliable hearsay under rule 1102(b)(6), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. All of this evidence supported a reasonable belief that defendant possessed 
drug paraphernalia. 
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Thus, the State produced ample evidence to support a reasonable belief that 
defendant committed each of the crimes charged in the information. The magistrate 
therefore properly bound defendant over on the charges. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the trial court's refusal to 
quash the bindover. 
Respectfully submitted this l( day of October, 2001. 
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U.S. CONST, amend. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall 
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by 
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted 
with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of counsel for his defense. 
UTAH CONST, art. I, § 12 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and defend 
in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against 
him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the 
witnesses against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance of 
witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury of 
the county or district in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and 
the right to appeal in all cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before 
final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the rights herein 
guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; 
a wife shall not be compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against 
his wife, nor shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Where the defendant is otherwise entitled to a preliminary examination, the 
function of that examination is limited to determining whether probable cause 
exists unless otherwise provided by statute. Nothing in this constitution shall 
preclude the use of reliable hearsay evidence as defined by statute or rule in whole 
or in part at any preliminary examination to determine probable cause or at any 
pretrial proceeding with respect to release of the defendant if appropriate 
discovery is allowed as defined by statute or rule. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-8 (1998 & Supp. 2001) 
(I) Prohibited acts A - Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, 
manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, 
offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or 
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where: 
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results 
in any violation of any provision of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, 
or 37d that is a felony; and 
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations 
of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on separate occasions that 
are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to 
whom the person occupies a position of organizer, supervisor, or any 
other position of management. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to: 
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II or a controlled substance analog 
is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent 
conviction is guilty of a first degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a 
third degree felony, and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of 
a second degree felony; or 
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor 
and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) 
or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as 
provided by law, but if the trier of fact fmds a firearm as defined in Section 
76-10-501 was used, carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate 
possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the court 
shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run 
consecutively and not concurrently; and the court may additionally sentence the 
person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run 
consecutively and not concurrently. 
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (I )(a)(iv) is guilty of a first 
degree felony punishable by imprisonment for an indeterminate term of not less 
than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the 
sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(2) Prohibited acts B - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, 
directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his professional 
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, 
room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place knowingly and 
intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully 
possessing, using, or distributing controlled substances in any of those 
locations; or 
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or 
forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to: 
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second 
degree felony; 
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is 
more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a controlled substance 
analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or 
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from 
any part of the plant, and the amount is more than one ounce but less than 
16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the 
exterior boundaries of property occupied by any correctional facility as defined 
in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be 
sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b). 
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled 
substance by a person, that person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater 
penalty than provided in this Subsection (2). 
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other 
controlled substances not included in Subsection (2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), 
including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Upon a second conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and 
upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a third degree 
felony. 
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is: 
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor; 
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and 
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony. 
(3) Prohibited acts C - Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled 
substance a license number which is fictitious, revoked, suspended, or 
issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled 
substance, to assume the title of, or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, 
wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized 
person; 
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the 
administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to prescribe or dispense to 
any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to 
procure the administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation 
or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any controlled substance 
from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a 
prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or the use of a false 
name or address; 
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a 
controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any prescription or 
written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or 
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other 
thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the trademark, trade name, or 
other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any 
of the foregoing upon any drug or container or labeling so as to render any 
drug a counterfeit controlled substance. 
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third 
degree felony. 
(4) Prohibited acts D - Penalties: 
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized 
under this chapter who commits any act declared to be unlawful under this 
section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, 
Chapter 37b, Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject 
to the penalties and classifications under Subsection (4)(b) if the act is 
committed: 
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds 
of any of those schools; 
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or 
on the grounds of any of those schools or institutions; 
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or 
grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used for an activity 
sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) 
and (ii); 
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility; 
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center; 
(vi) in a church or synagogue; 
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie 
house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent thereto; 
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure; 
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in 
Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii); or 
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, 
regardless of where the act occurs. 
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree 
felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not less than five years if the 
penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection 
would have been a first degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence 
may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation. 
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have 
been less than a first degree felony but for this Subsection (4), a person 
convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the 
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense. 
(d) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor 
mistakenly believed the individual to be 18 years of age or older at the time of 
the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor 
mistakenly believed that the location where the act occurred was not as 
described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location where the act 
occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a). 
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B 
misdemeanor. 
(6) (a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not 
in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty or sanction authorized by law. 
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another 
state, conviction or acquittal under federal law or the law of another state for 
the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state. 
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which 
shows a person or persons produced, manufactured, possessed, distributed, or 
dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the 
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or 
substances. 
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of 
his professional practice only and not for humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or 
administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be 
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision. 
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on: 
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who 
manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation controlled substance for 
use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the 
ordinary course of professional practice or research; or 
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his 
employment. 
(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any 
person or circumstances, is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter shall be 
given effect without the invalid provision or application. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37a-5 
(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug 
paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, 
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, 
contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled 
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or 
manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug paraphernalia, knowing that the drug 
paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, 
manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, 
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a 
person under 18 years of age who is three years or more younger than the person 
making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony. 
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine, 
handbill, or other publication any advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the 
advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who 
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. 
Utah R. Crim. P. 7(h) 
(h)(1) Unless otherwise provided, a preliminary examination shall be held under 
the rules and laws applicable to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has 
the burden of proof and shall proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the 
state's case, the defendant may testify under oath, call witnesses, and present 
evidence. The defendant may also cross-examine adverse witnesses. 
(2) If from the evidence a magistrate finds probable cause to believe that the 
crime charged has been committed and that the defendant has committed it, the 
magistrate shall order, in writing, that the defendant be bound over to answer in 
the district court. The findings of probable cause may be based on hearsay in 
whole or in part. Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by 
unlawful means are not properly raised at the preliminary examination. 
(3) If the magistrate does not find probable cause to believe that the crime 
charged has been committed or that the defendant committed it, the magistrate 
shall dismiss the information and discharge the defendant. The magistrate may 
enter findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal 
and discharge do not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution 
for the same offense. 
Utah R.Evid. 1101 
(a) Courts and magistrates. These rules apply to all actions and proceedings in the 
courts of this state except as otherwise provided in Subdivisions (b) and (c). 
(b) Rules inapplicable. The rules (other than with respect to privileges) do not 
apply in the following situations: 
(1) Preliminary questions of fact which are to be determined under Rule 104(a); 
(2) Grand jury proceedings; 
(3) Miscellaneous proceedings for extradition, sentencing or granting or 
revocation of probation, issuance of warrants for arrest, criminal summonses 
and search warrants and proceedings with respect to release on bail or 
otherwise; 
(4) Contempt proceedings in which the court may act summarily; 
(c) In a criminal preliminary examination, reliable hearsay shall be admissible as 
provided under Rule 1102. 
UtahR. Evid. 1102 
(a) Statement of the rule. Reliable hearsay is admissible at criminal preliminary 
examinations. 
(b) Definition of reliable hearsay. For purposes of criminal preliminary 
examinations only, reliable hearsay includes: 
(1) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under the Utah R.ules of Evidence; 
(2) hearsay evidence admissible at trial under Rule 804 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence, regardless of the availability of the declarant at the preliminary 
examination; 
(3) evidence establishing the foundation for or the authenticity of any exhibit; 
(4) scientific, laboratory, or forensic reports and records; 
(5) medical and autopsy reports and records; 
(6) a statement of a non-testifying peace officer to a testifying peace officer; 
(7) a statement made by a child victim of physical abuse or a sexual offense 
which is promptly reported by the child victim and recorded in accordance with 
Rule 15.5 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure; 
(8) a statement of a declarant that is written, recorded, or transcribed verbatim 
which is: 
(A) under oath or affirmation; or 
(B) pursuant to a notification to the declarant that a false statement made 
therein is punishable; 
(9) other hearsay evidence with similar indicia of reliability, regardless of 
admissibility at trial under Rules 803 and 804 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
(c) Continuance for production of additional evidence. If hearsay evidence is 
proffered or admitted in the preliminary examination, a continuance of the hearing 
may be granted for the purpose of furnishing additional evidence if: 
(1) The magistrate finds that the hearsay evidence proffered or admitted is not 
sufficient and additional evidence is necessary for a bindover; or 
(2) The defense establishes that it would be so substantially and unfairly 
disadvantaged by the use of the hearsay evidence as to outweigh the interests of 
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IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SANPETE COUNTY 2 0°* 
COURT OF
 APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Criminal No. , 2 0 0 1 0 2 V 8 - C A 
PRELIMINARY HEARING TRANSCRIPT 
MITCHELL HILL and 
JEREMY fflLL 
Defendants. 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on the 27th day of September, 1999, the 
PRELIMINARY HEARING was video recorded before the Honorable Judge Jensen 
at the Sanpete County Courthouse, Manti, Utah and was transcribed into transcript 
form by Richard C. Tattoo, a Certified Shorthand Reporter and Notary Public in and 


























JEREMY. WPD February 22,2000 RickTatton 
A P P E A R A N C E S 
Page 2 
For the State of Utah: Mr. Michael D. Jorgensen 
Attorney at Law 
37 North 100 East 
Sallna, Utah 84654 
For the Defendants: Mr. Shelden Carter 
Attorney at Law 
3325 N. University Avenue #200 
Provo, Utah 84604 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. The case that we call 
at this time is the State of Utah vs. Mitchell Hill and Jeremy Edward Hill and they are 
present in court and for the State of Utah Mr. Jorgensen and is it Mr. Carter? 
MR. CARTER: Yes, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Mr. Carter representing the defendants. Mr. Jorgensen are 
you prepared to go forward? 
MR. JORGENSEN: We are Your Honor. Just one procedural matter. We 
filed an amended information on Mr. Hill, Mitchell Hill excuse me and gave a copy to 
Mr. Carter at this time. The court has it. It is already in the file. There are some 
typographical errors and supposed to be identical to the charges against Mr. Mitchell 
Hill and Mr. Jeremy Hill and the one against Mr. Mitchell Hill was incorrect so we 
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MR. CARTER: Is this being recorded Judge ? 
THE COURT: Yes, it is. 
MR. CARTER: For the record we would object to the motion to amend 
and I have just received it and have not even had an opportunity to review it at this 
point 
THE COURT: Mr. Jorgensen? 
MR. JORGENSEN: I think the objection can be noted, Your Honor but I 
think the status of the law as I read it, I have the right to amend at any time up until 
the time of the trail in this matter. 
MR. CARTER: I think that is factually correct and it catches us by surprise 
and I think we are entitled to a continuance. 
MR. JORGENSEN:. That is true, Your Honor, it is a surprise. 
THE COURT: Is the information for Mitchell Hill exactly the same as for 
Jeremy Hill? 
MR. CARTER: That is what I am trying to locate Judge. 
THE COURT: How could that create a problem? 
MR. CARTER: I don't know. I am just looking it over at this point and 
just trying to protect— 
THE COURT: Do you need some time or need to go off the record. 
MR. CARTER: I don't see any prejudice that would be caused. It looks 
like it is. 
THE COURT: Do you withdraw your motion? 
MR. CARTER: Yes. 
THE COURT: So are you prepared to go forward Mr. Carter? 
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THE COURT: Okay, anything in opening Mr. Jorgensen? 
MR. JORGENSEN: Just briefly, Your Honor, we would just call one 
witness and testify with regard to the incidences on July the 16th involving Mr. 
Jeremy Hill and Mr. Mitchell Hill. 
THE COURT: Anything in opening Mr. Carter? 
MR. CARTER: No, Judge.. 
THE COURT: Call your first witness Mr. Jorgensen. 
MR. JORGENSEN: We would call Detective Clark Thomas to the stand. 
1 THE COURT: Would you please come forward and be sworn by the clerk. 
CLARK THOMAS 
called as a witness by and on behalf of the State of Utah being first duly sworn by the 
> Clerk of the Court was examined and testified as follows: 
THE COURT: Please take the witness stand and state your name and your 
occupation for the record. 
THE WITNESS: My name is Clark Thomas. I am a detective with the 









BY MR. JORGENSEN: 
Q. How long have you been with the task force? 
A. Just over a year. 








































We work exclusively in narcotics investigations. 
And were you in Sanpete County, State of Utah on July the 16th of 1999? 
Yes, I was. 
And tell us what you were doing? 
Conducting a narcotics investigation. 
Where did this take place? 
In Mt Pleasant 
And with whom were you, who were you with? 
Detective Jenkins and also the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. 
And were you with a confidential informant? 
Yes. 
Can you tell us at approximately 10:00 that night what was going on? 
We had met with the confidential informant at a pre-arranged location. He was 
given currency supplied by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force and at the first we 
searched his person and the vehicle and then proceeded to the Triangle Bar that is 
located in Mt. Pleasant, Utah. 
Q- And was he wired at that point and time? 




Was that monitoring device functioning? 
Yes, it was. 




Did you go into the bar? Did he go into the Triangle Lounge in Mt. Pleasant, 
A. Yes sir. 
JEREMY. WPD Fcbruaiy 22,2000 RickTatton Page 6 
1 Q. With whom did he meet? 
2 A. He met with Mitchell Hill. 
3 Q. Can you tell us what you heard? 
4 A. Mitchell Hill arranged for the sale of— 
5 MR. CARTER: We would object, Judge, he asked him what he heard not 
6 to draw a conclusions about what happened. I mean, we would ask him to respond 
7 appropriately to the question and actually tell us what was said instead of giving us 
8 conclusions. 
9 THE COURT: Mr. Jorgensen? 
10 BYMR.JORGENSEN: 
11 I Q. Can you tell us what was said to the best of your recollection at this point and 
12 time? 
13 A. To the best of my recollection the confidential informant engaged in a 
14 conversation with Mitchell Hill. Mitchell Hill had informed him that Jeremy Hill 
15 would be there presently and that Jeremy Hill did have Methamphetamine for sale. 
16 Q. Did Jeremy Hill eventually show up? 
17 A. Yes. 
18 Q. And can you tell us what happened at that point and time? 







(WHEREUPON, the clerk indicated to the judge that there might be a problem with 
the recording device and a recess was taken.) 
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problems. The witness will again take the stand and I would remind you that you are 
still under oath. Mr. Jorgensen, the record was correct up to the point that we recessed 
and we were recording so you may proceed from where you were at that point. 
MR. JORGENSEN: If I can remember. 
THE COURT: I hope your memory is better man mine. 
BY MR. JORGENSEN: 
Q. Mr. Thomas, I believe you previously testified that your confidential informant 
had gone into the Triangle Lounge at Mt. Pleasant City, State of Utah, is that correct? 
A. Yes, it is. 
Q. Why don't we start from that point. 
A. The confidential informant once he entered the Triangle Lounge eventually 
Q. What did Mr. Hill tell him? 
A. Mitchell Hill had informed him that Jeremy Hill would be there, I don't 
remember the time frame, that he would be there later that evening and that Jeremy 
did indeed have Methamphetamine that the confidential informant could purchase. 
Q. Mr. Hill did show up, Jeremy Hill? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And they went outside of the lounge, the bar? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did you observe this? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And there was a transaction? 
A. Yes, there was. 
Q. And what was the nature of that transaction? 
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A. What was purported to be one gram of Methamphetamine for $60.00. 
Q. What action did you, what happened at that point and time after that? 
A. Jeremy Hill and the confidential informant did converse for a while after that. 
Subsequently, the confidential infomiant excused himself and was surveilled at the 
pre-arranged location. 
Q. Did you search the confidential information at that time? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And did he deliver anything to you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What did he deliver to you? 
A. What was purported to be the one gram of Methamphetamine. 
Q. And what did you do with that substance? 
A. It was placed in an evidence bag signed and sealed by myself and Detective 
Jenkins and eventually placed in the evidence locker at the Sevier County Sheriffs 
Office. 
Q. Did you do any field tests on it? 
A. I don't recall if we did or not. 
Q. Based on your experience, tell us what your experience is? 
A. It appeared to be Methamphetamine. 
Q. Okay. And it was purported to be Methamphetamine? 
A. Yes. 
Q. The Triangle Lounge and the area where the transaction was located in Mt. 
Pleasant City? 
A. Yes. 
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feet of it? 
A. Most definitely an arcade and a church and Wasatch Academy might even fail 
within that thousand feet. 
Q. How far away is the arcade approximately? 
A. One city block. 
Q. And the church? 
A. I don't believe it is quite a city block. 
Q. These are standard 500 foot blocks? 
A. I believe so. 
Q. Do you have occasion again on July the 31st to be in Mt. Pleasant City or Mt. 
Pleasant? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And why were you there? 
A. Narcotics investigation. 
Q. What time did that investigation start? 
A. I will have to look at my report sir. (Indicating) It was approximately 12:30. 
Q. Why were you there? 
A. Well, I have to correct that. It was prior to 12:30. A confidential informant 
had contacted us and informed us that Jeremy and Mitchell Hill were transporting to 
Mt. Pleasant area a half an ounce of Methamphetamine. 
Q. So what action did you then take? 
A. The confidential informant was, a monitoring device was placed on his person 
and arrangements were made with Jeremy and Mitchell Hill to meet the confidential 
information at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant. 
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A. It did not 
Q. What happened? 
A. When Jeremy and Mitchell Hill arrived at the arranged location they were 
arrested. 
Q. And did you do that arrest? 
A. I was present, yes sir. 
Q. Can you tell us what happened? 
A. Subsequently found in the vehicle was a glass pipe with residue and a half an 
ounce of what field tested positive for Methamphetamine. 


















Q. And why were you at 64 Main? 
A. We were monitoring the confidential informant with the monitoring device 
that was placed on him and also we had the area under surveillance. 
Q. This is where the transaction was supposed to take place? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Again where is this in relation to the church, arcade or school? 
A. It is right on the same city block 64 West main and I believe the Triangle 
Lounge is probably 80 or 96 West Main. They are on the same city block sir. 
Q. Then both Mr. Jeremy Hill and Mr. Mitchell Hill were present? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And you field tested the substance? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And it tested positive for what? 
A. It tested positive for Methamphetamine. 
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Q. Subsequent to the arrest, did you request anything else from Mr. Jeremy Hill 
and Mr. Mitchell Hill? 
A. Yes, they both provided urine samples and they were positive for 
Methamphetamine. 
Q. You briefly talked about certain things that were found in the truck. Can you 
tell us what they were again? 
A. I will have to refer to my report. Commander Piersonofthe Central Utah 
Narcotics Task Force located a Camel Cigarette Container which contained-
MR. CARTER: We would object to any testimony coming from anybody 
else other than this witness. 
THE COURT: Overruled. 
MR. CARTER: Do that on the basis of no right to confrontation to my 
clients. They are supposed to under the constitution of the State of Utah and the 
Federal Constitution. 
MR. JORGENSEN: I believe this is reliable hearsay and admissible for 
the purposes of a Preliminary Hearing pursuant to Rule 701. 
THE COURT: The objection is overruled. You may answer the 
question. 
THE WITNESS: Commander Pierson located a Camel Cigarette container 
which contained two yellowish rocky substances in two plastic bags which was 
believed to be Methamphetamine under the front seat of this vehicle. Officer Wendell 
Thayne of Adult, Parole and Probation recovered a glass pipe — 
MR. CARTER: Your Honor, I don't mean to be obstreperous but I would 
like to preserve my objection on the same grounds on the basis of confrontation that I 
previously imposed and can I just have a continuing objection to any testimony 
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1 relating to any other individuals that this officer does not have personal knowledge of. 
2 THE COURT: Your objection is overruled. You may answer the question. 
3 THE WITNESS: Officer Wendall Thayne of the Adult, Parole and 
4 Probation recovered a glass pipe with a white powdery residue from a compartment 
5 located on the driver's door of this vehicle. 
6 BYMR.JORGENSEN: 
7 Q. Did you have an interview with Mr. Jeremy Hill? 
8 A. Yes. 
9 Q. Was he advised of his Miranda Rights? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 I Q. And did he indicate anything to you at that point and time? 
12 1 A. He did. 
13 Q. What was that? 
14 A. I would have to refer to my report again. I am sorry. Jeremy Hill informed 
15 members of the Task Force, myself included, that he had purchased this half ounce of 
16 Methamphetamine from a contact in Salt Lake City. 
17 Q. For what purpose? 
18 I A. He had arranged to sell this to a Mike that lived in the back of the video store 
19 located at 64 West Main in Mt. Pleasant, Utah. 
20 I Q. Did Jeremy Hill indicate any use? 
A. Yes, he freely admitted that his brother Mitchell and he had smoked some of 
the Methamphetamine on the way from Salt Lake while traveling to Mt. Pleasant. 





25 CROSS EXAMINATION 
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BY MR. CARTER: 
Q. Officer on the 16th day of July of 1999, who was your confidential informant? 
MR. JORGENSEN: I would object to that, Your Honor. I don't believe it 
is appropriate at this point and time. 
THE COURT: Sustained. 
MR. CARTER: May I make a record for that one as well, Your Honor? 
THE COURT: You may. 
MR. CARTER: One of the difficulties we have is this officer is simply 
providing a number of facts and events which he has no personal knowledge of which 
I objected to on the basis of confrontation and of course that was overruled. Your 
Honor, we are now in the area of the confidential informant which is kind of 
foundational to the case and that witness if we are not able to even Cross Examine 
and not even able to have location or identification of that it simply disenables us to 
have an effective right to the Preliminary Hearing, that would be our argument. I 
think the State is actually bound to produce the name and provide us that information. 
MR. JORGENSEN: I agree eventually, we are, Your Honor, but for the 
purpose of the Preliminary Hearing we are not. 
THE COURT: Your motion is overruled. 
BY MR. CARTER: 
Q. This confidential informant and you searched him before the events of July the 
16th of on the date of July the 16th prior to the supposed exchange? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. All right. How did you do that? Did you do it personally or did somebody else 
do that? 
A. Myself and Detective Jenkins were present. 
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1 Q. Where did that search take place? 
2 A. At the pre-arranged location. 
3 Q. Which would be? 
4 A. I am not sure of the exact address. It was a dirt road in the fields west of Mt 
5 Pleasant 
6 Q. How did you search him? 
7 A. A physical search. 
8 Q. Just simply a pat down? 
9 A. I would say it was a pretty extensive pat down. 
10 Q. Did you ask him to disrobe or take off any articles of clothing? 
11 A. No. 
12 Q. Did you search his vehicle or did he have a vehicle? 
13 A. Yes, we searched the vehicle. 
14 Q. Was this the vehicle that he drove to that location? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. How extensive a search did you conduct of that? 
17 A. Very extensive. 
18 Q. How is fairly extensive? 
19 A. Under the seats, the glove compartment 
20 Q. Under the dash? 
21 A. Under the dash. 
22 Q. Under the backseat? 
23 A. Yes, it is a fairly extensive search. 
24 Q. Did you go into the trunk? 
25 A. No. 
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1 J Q. Is there a location in that vehicle where articles or some contraband such as 
2 Methamphetamine might have been located that would not have been discovered by 
3 yourself? 
4 A. Possibly. 
5 1 Q. All right. Would that also apply to the extent of the search of the person? 
6 1 A. I don't believe so. 
7 J Q. All right, you didn't ask him to disrobe in any form or fashion? 
8 1 A. No. 
9 J Q. You did what you call a pat down search? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. And is that similar to a pat down search for weapons? 
12 A. No, a little more extensive than a search for weapons. 
13 Q. Did you ask him to empty his pockets? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 Q. And did he do that? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Did you ask him to take his socks off or anything of that nature? 
18 A. I had him remove his shoes and roll the top of his socks down. 
19 Q. All right. Did you ask him to look inside of his underwear or any place like 
20 that? 
211 A. I felt inside the waist band area. 
22 Q. That would be the extent of the search? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. All right. Now I assume a similar search was conducted after what you report 
25 to be the events of the sales of Methamphetamine on July the 16th correct? 
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1 A. Yes sir. 
2 Q. And it would be a similar search as well? 
3 A. Yes. 
4 1 Q. At at that time, did the person whoever it might be gave to you what you 
5 purport to be Methamphetamine? 
6 A. Yes sir. 
7 Q. You didn't do a field test on it yourself? 
8 1 A. I don't recall if we did. 
9 Q. You don't know if anybody else did a field test on it, correct? 
10 A. No. 
11 Q. All right and we obviously don't have a lab results, correct? 
12 A. No. 
13 Q. Your information you are giving us today would be limited to your visual 
14 observation of the supposed substance? 
15 A. Yes sir. 
16 Q. And we don't have a correct chain of evidence here from the supposed 
17 informant to the time of the revealed search and your searching him post-incident and 
18 delivering this post-Methamphetamine to him correct? 
19 MR. JOREGENSEN: I object to that just because I lost track. 
20 MR. CARTER: Probably a good objection. Let me restate it again. 
21 THE COURT: You may. 
22 BY MR. CARTER: 
23 Q. Did you see where it might be;, did you maintain a constant surveillance from 
24 the location where the supposed transaction occurred to the time of the delivery of the 
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A. Yes sir. 
Q. He wasn't inside of a building? 
A. From the time of the transaction to the time it took place, he might have went 
back into the bar momentarily, but I don't recall sir. 
Q. All right. So it would be fair to say that you didn't maintain him under 
constant visual surveillance? 
A. No sir, not when he was in the Triangle Lounge. 
Q. There may have been a possibility that maybe he picked up some 
Methamphetamine from somebody else or some other contraband from somebody 
else? 
A. I suppose it is possible. 
Q. All right and that confidential informant is obviously not here today correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. All right. Is he still working under cover for your folks? 
A. Yes. 
Q. All right. And on the date of July the 16th can you tell me, well you report the 
matter was monitored by surveillance equipment, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you have a tape of those events, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And I think in your discussions with Mr. Jorgensen and I, you replied that you 
would provide that to us within 30 days, correct? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. All right and is that an audible tape and you listened to it, I am assuming? 
A. Yes. 
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1 I Q. And it works and you can hear voices? 
2 A. Yes. 
3 Q. All right. And during that process can you tell me exactly what Mitchell Hill 
4 said during that part of the events of July the 16th to the best you recall? 
5 A. I have already testified to the best of my recollection that Mitchell Hill had 
6 informed the confidential informant. 
7 I Q. Again, officer you are telling me conclusions of what you believe happened. 
8 Tell me exactly what Mitchell Hill said if you could. 
9 A. I don't recall the exact verbatim. 
10 Q. Do you remember what your CI said? 
11 I A. No sir. 
12 Q. All right That is one of the reasons-
13 J A. We have the tape for evidence. 
14 Q. All right. So you don't recall exactly what Mr. Mitchell Hill said or what your 
15 CI said? 
16 A. Not word for word, no. 
17 Q. This CI, did you arrest him previously or what is the benefit of the bargain for 
18 doing this exchange? I mean did you have him arrested for other charges and did you 
19 say that you would dismiss these charges if he would go and get so many buys? 
20 MR* JORGENSEN: I would object at this point and time. I don't think it 
21 is relevant 
22 MR. CARTER: It goes to the credibility. I ought to be able to at least 
23 challenge that. 
24 THE COURT: I will let you continue. Answer the question. 
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BY MR. CARTER: 
Q. Were you compensating him financially? 
A. No. 
Q. Was it, what was it? Was he just simply a good citizen trying to clean up 
drug trade? 
A. I wouldn't say that 
Q. What was his motivation for doing this? 
MR. JORGENSEN: Your Honor, I am going to object, I think he is 
obviously attempting to find out the identity at this point and time and we don't want 
to divulge. 
THE COURT: I want him to answer this question. 
Central Utah Narcotics Task Force in the interests of a third party. 
BY MR. CARTER: 
Q. So he is doing it for somebody else? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. I am assuming you don't want to tell me who that third party was? 
A. No sir. 
Q. What? 
A. No, I don't 
Q. And so he was working off some trade for somebody else's charges being 
dismissed? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. At this point Judge, for me to conduct, I think in fact of the Preliminary 
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reconvene at such time that the prosecution would feel comfortable in disclosing to 
me who the confidential informant is. 
THE COURT: Your motion is denied. 
BY MR. CARTER: 
Q. Tell me the criminal history regarding your confidential informant? Do you 
know what that is? 
A. I do. 
Q. And do you know what prior history he had or she has? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And what is that? 
A. 1 am not sure of the exact charges. 1 know that the informant is on probation 
with the Adult Parole and Probation. 
Q. Would that be for a felony charge, a misdemeanor charge? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. All right So the person is on probation to some extent correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Do you know how many charges? 
A. I don't 
Q. Do you know, what I am going to is trustworthiness of your CI and do you 






A. This informant has been reliable on several occasions. 
Q. Has he ever misrepresented facts to you? 
A. Not to my knowledge. 
Q. All right. Have you worked with him. Are you the person who has 
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A. In the Task Force? 
Q. Yes. 
A. He has worked with a number of us that is on the task force. I wouldn't say I 
was the supervisor. 
Q. Would it be fair to say at this point you really don't know how reliable this 
informant is? 
A. I stated he has been reliable on numerous occasions in the past 
Q. How many occasions is numerous? Has he worked with you on five cases or 
more? 
A. Or more. 
Q. Ten or more? 
A. Probably about that 
Q. All right and has he ever misrepresented to you, lied to you, or led you astray? 
A. I don't believe so. 
Q. Regarding the events of July the 16th you tell us that you over heard some 
conversations regarding Jeremy Hill correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell us exactly what Jeremy said and what your CI said at that time? 
A. No, not word for word. 
Q. And so after the conclusion of the discussions you and Jeremy and your CI and 
the CI goes back into the bar and stays for a period of time, correct? 
A. Probably just a few minutes. 
Q. All right a few minutes be two minutes or is that five minutes, ten minutes, do 
you know? 
A. Probably two minutes or less. 
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1 J Q. I am assuming other people were inside the bar other than the confidential 
2 informant? 
3 A. Yes sir. 
4 I Q. Now at that point then the CI leaves? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 Q. Did Mr. Jeremy Hill or Mr. Mitchell Hill leave prior to the CI leaving the 
7 Triangle Bar? 
8 A. No. 
9 I Q. The CI still remained in the Triangle Bar? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 Q. Why didn't you go arrest Mr. Jeremy Hill or Mitchell Hill at that time? 
12 A. We usually try and get more than one sale case on an individual. 
13 Q. So you are holding back for another buy? 
14 A. Or two or three. 
15 Q. Did your CI tell you what history he had with either Jeremy or Mitchell Hill? 
16 A. I don't recall. 
17 Q. Did you give the CI any instructions, or courses, or education regarding issues 
18 of entrapment? 
19 A. Yes. 
20 J Q. What do you do to prevent the issues of entrapment from being made? 
21 | A. Every confidential informant we have, we have a packet that they fill out. It 
22 | explains issues of entrapment, if they need any further explanation of that. 
23 | Q. Do you have a copy of that available? 
24 I A. I believe so. 
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documents used with this CI, but your general form that you use apparently with other 
people and the CI? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would that be okay? 
A. I would have to clear it with my commander. 
Q. Okay. Tell me about the date of July the 31st when did your CI contact you 
regarding this proposed exchange? 
A. It was in the morning of the 31st. 
Q. What conversations did you hear between your CI and Mitchell Hill if any? 
A. There is a conversation of the confidential informant and Mr. Hill that was 
recorded on the monitoring device. 
A. No, not word for word. 
Q. All right and I am assuming that goes both for Mr. Mitchell Hill as well as 
your CI? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And then I am assuming that is also true, that you don't have a memory of the 
exact conversation between your CI and Jeremy Hill correct? 
A. No, not word for word. 
Q. Okay and again on these events of July the 31st we have no laboratory results 
regarding whether this substance is Methamphetamine or not? 
A. No. 
Q. All right. Did you do a field test? 
A. I believe I did on this one. I believe myself and Commander Pierson, there was 
probably three or four of us involved in the field tests. 
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1 Q. I do not note that in the report. Do you have an independent memory of that 
2 yourself, or not that you did a field test, or that is somebody else relating to you what 
3 they did? 
4 I A. No, I am fairly confident I was there when the field test was conducted on this 
5 substance. 
6 Q. And I am assuming you don't know other than you know sticking a tab in or 
7 whatever you do, you don't know how the substance or agents work, correct? 
8 A. Correct 
9 Q. All right tell me about after your arrest what is your basis for the arrest of Mr. 
10 Mitchell Hill or Jeremy Hill, you do not have a warrant of arrest, correct? 
11 A. Correct 
12 Q. You just what you believe to be what you overheard on your monitoring 
13 devices? 
14 A. Right 
15 Q. All right, based upon that you arrest both Mitchell Hill and Jeremy Hill? 
16 A. Yes. 
17 Q. Did you ever see Mitchell Hill transfer narcotics to your CI? 
18 A. No. 
19 Q. You simply have Mr. Mitchell Hill being present at this location and I think it 
20 I is 64 West Main, correct? 
21 I A. Yes sir. 
22 I Q. And that is it, he was just simply there? 
23 I A. Yes, he had arranged for the sale. 
24 | Q. Tell me what he did to arrange those? You tell me you don't remember. I 
25 I would like to know what he did. 
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1 A. I don't recall the exact phone conversation as I testified earlier. 
2 Q. Okay. Exact phone conversation did you say? 
3 I A. Yes, the conversations for the arrangement. 
4 J Q. Were you listening via a phone to that conversation? 
§ I A. We had a monitoring device. 
6 Q. On who? 
7 1 A. On the confidential informant. 
8 I Q. So you were able to just hear what the confidential informant was saying? 
9 J A. I believe there is we can also hear Mitchell Hill. 
10 Q. All right So ifl understand correctly, this is a phone call which you alleged 
11 I to occur between Mitchell Hill and your CI and what you believe to be monitoring 
12 and over hearing on the wire, correct? 
13 A. Right. 
14 Q. And that conversation is probably best picked up from your own CI, correct? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. And then you may or may not be able to hear the conversations from allegedly 
17 Mitchell Hill via the phone? 
18 A. Right 
19 Q. When you make the stop and detention of Mr. Jeremy Hill, is Mitchell Hill 
20 present in the car at that time? 
21 A. No, he wasn't 
22 Q. He is separated from Mr. Jeremy Hill correct? 
23 A. Right 
24 Q. But at that point you decide to still arrest Mitchell Hill? 
25 A. Yes. 
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Q. When you get them to the police station you start asking Jeremy Hill 
questions, correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever advise him of his rights per the Miranda decision? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Can you tell me when that event took place? I do not see it in your report 
A. I can't 
Q. Did you do it or did somebody else do it? 
A. I believe one of the other officers did. 
Q. All right. Did you have him sign a waiver form or anything of that nature? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. All right Tell me about this urine test What did you do to accomplish this 
task of them providing a urine sample to you? 
A. Can you clarify that The way we tested it or what? 
Q. No, how did you approach them? Did you go up to Jeremy and Mitchell and 
say that "hey, guys do you want to provide urine samples" and they said that "sure 
you bet whatever you want" Is that how it happened? 
A. Pretty much. 
Q. You didn't say anything else to them? 
A. It was a voluntaiy urine sample. 
Q. Did you suggest to them you could get it by warrant or otherwise? 
A. I don't recall. 
Q. Did you make any comments regarding taking them to the hospital to obtain 
the urine sample? 
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Q. Did you do anything to suggest to them then that in fact if they didn't comply 
with your request that you would accomplish the urine sample by some other means? 
A. I don't recall if we informed them that we could obtain a body fluid search 
warrant or not I don't recall sir. 
Q. And you say the glass pipe was found by some other officer? 
A. Yes sir, Wendell Thayne. 
Q. And the Methamphetamine was found by some other officer? 
A. Commander Pierson. 
Q. And this was in a vehicle that was fully driven by Jeremy Hill? 
A. It was driven by Jeremy Hill. 
Q. And Mitchell Hill was separate and outside of the vehicle when you conducted 
your search of the vehicle? 
A. They were both out of the vehicle when the search was conducted of the 
vehicle. 
Q. Nothing further.. 
THE COURT: Mr. Joregensen anything further? 
MR. JORGENSEN: No further questions. 
THE COURT: You may step down. 
MR. JORGENSEN: The State would rest at this time. 
MR. CARTER: For the record, Judge, I believe I know what the court is 
going to do with my objection but I would again reinform that to my understanding 
and to my satisfaction this has been a fairly ineffective Preliminary Hearing for the 
benefits of my client because I have been disenabled in pursuing much of the line of 
questioning due to my failure to to be able to confront witnesses. We find a 
supposedly a glass pipe. We found supposedly Methamphetamine and I don't have 
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the ability to challenge the chain of evidence. There is apparently a bunch of 
conversations that go on that we really don't have a good idea of what was said or 
what was not said or what the officer actually heard and did not overhear. We are 
really relying a great deal on the confidential informant I would again ask the court to 
adjourn this and allow us an extension so that we might be able to present witnesses 
or call this officer or this confidential informant to this hearing due to our right of 
confrontation. 
THE COURT: The motion is well taken but denied You have the right at 
this time Mr. Carter to proceed with a defense? 
MR. CARTER: We would not put on any evidence at this time, Your 
Honor. I would again probably for the basis of the motion to the court to dismiss the 
preliminary hearing. I do not believe sufficient case exists at this time or information 
is basically through Officer Thomas who is apparently kind of a point man, he is a 
collaborator of all the data that has been produced. We don't have a lab test. We don't 
even have a field test We have eye sight, looks pretty good, it looks like 
Methamphetamine that is the best we have got 1 think that is not even sufficient for a 
preliminary hearing although I would submit that the level of proof is substantially 
less, but there is not been either lab test or any other test to document that this stuff is 
Methamphetamine. At this point we would again reassert our right to confrontation. 
We would also argue regarding Mitchell Hill that sufficient cause has been testified 
binding him over even as an accomplice liability. 
THE COURT: Mr. Jorgensen? 
MR. JORGENSEN: Well, Your Honor, I think we have met our burden of 
probable cause both on Mr. Jeremy Hill and Mr. Mitchell Hill and probable cause that 
the crime is committed, probable cause has been submitted. 
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THE COURT: The court finds in this case against Mitchell Hill and 
Jeremy Hill that there is probable cause to believe that a crime was committed. The 
court also finds that there is probable cause to believe that Mitchell Hill and Jeremy 
Hill committed the crime as has been listed in the information submitted by the State 
of Utah. The court hereby orders the defendants bound over to the Sixth District 
Court for trial and at this time I am required to set a time for to set a trial date. 
MR. JORGENSEN: No trial date, Your Honor, arraignment 
THE COURT: Arraignment, no, no, I am sorry, you are right, arraignment. 
I need to set an arraignment date and you need to look at your calendar. You need to 
look at your calendar Mr. Carter and tell me if you are free next Wednesday? 
MR. CARTER: I would like 30 days out if I could and the reason is they 
are going to provide the tapes and some of the other documents. 
THE COURT: That is fine. 
MR. JORGENSEN: Your Honor, my suggestion is at least the cases are 
one case is assigned to Judge Mower and one assigned to Judge Mclff and so it 
doesn't matter which day you do it I think that the purpose of arraignment, Your 
Honor, we could do it short of 30 days. 
MR. CARTER: I may want to try and challenge them and bring the court 
up to date regarding what I believe to be issues on right of confrontation, those tapes 
and everything and they may provide all my answers and they may not 
THE COURT: Okay 30 days. 
THE CLERK: You are probably looking at the 27th, and that is Judge 
Mclff s. 
THE COURT: 27th day of October, is that all right with you Mr. Carter? 
MR. CARTER: We are going to do that at 10:30? 
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THE COURT: Yes, at 10:30 A.M. 
MR. CARTER: Yes, that will work. 
THE COURT: Okay. This matter will be set for the 27th of October at 
10:30 A.M. this courtroom. 
MR. CARTER: We appreciate that 
THE COURT: You are welcome. 
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STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF WASATCH 
:ss. 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that the Preliminary Hearing of Mitchell Hill and 
Jeremy Hill was electronically recorded, and thereafter caused by me, Richard C. 
Tatton, to be transcribed into typewriting to the best of my ability. 
I FURTHER CERTIFY that I am not of kin or otherwise associated with 
any of the parties to said cause of action, and that I am not interested in the event 
thereof. 
WITNESS my hand and official seal at Midway, Utah this 22nd day of 
February, 2000. 
RICHARD C. TATTON, CSR 
My Commission Expires: 
June 15,2001 MCHAM) a TATTON 
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COMM. EXP. 6-1S-2001 
